Introduction
When on 4 October 2005, the European Union's Council of Ministers agreed to begin accession talks with Croatia, the Croatian media compared this decision with international recognition of Croatia, which the European Union countries granted on 15 January 1992. Both decisions were controversial, and caused serious divisions within the European Union. In 1992, it was Germany's initiative that persuaded the then 12-member EU to recognise Croatia and Slovenia. Thirteen years later, Austria played a similar role when it conditioned its agreement to beginning of negotiations with Turkey with the same status for Croatia.
The Croatian journey to the European Union has been long delayed, due primarily to reasons that were of Croatia's own making. For the whole decade of the 1990s, Croatian politics was characterised by an authoritarian style of governance, promoted by President Franjo Tudjman (1990 Tudjman ( -1999 and his party, the Croatian Democratic This article focuses on this radical change of policy -between Tudjmanist scepticism and hostility towards the concept of Europe, and post-Tudjmanist pro-European narratives. I argue that the prospect of joining the European Union has already radically changed the character of Croatian politics in three major aspects. Firstly, it led to the defeat of isolationist nationalism, which characterised Croatian politics in the second half of the 1990s. Croatia no longer sees itself as a self-sufficient 'regional power' but as an integral part of a larger European project to which it wants to contribute. Secondly, the informal 'grand coalition for Europe' (in which now all major political parties participate) has successfully bridged the gaps between various ideological and ethnic segments of the Croatian population. For the first time since independence, Croatia is governed by a coalition which includes representatives of ethnic minorities, including the ethnic Serbs. At the same time, an unofficial 'coalition for Europe' closed the gap between former ideological adversaries -the reformed communists (SDP) and reformed nationalists (HDZ). Thirdly, the prospect of joining the European Union has fundamentally changed Croatian foreign policy orientation,
which is now open to regional co-operation, including with countries such as Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina. All of this was unthinkable in the 1990s, when Croatia was engaged in wars with its neighbours and even with its own Serb minority.
These changes in policy orientations were also reflected in personnel changes in the HDZ, in which the Tudjmanist forces have been successfully marginalised, while some of the most prominent politicians of the 1990s have left the party in protest.
Accession to the European Union is the main reason for these radical changes.
Isolation from Europe is no longer seen as a viable option but as a road to decay. As explained by Hidajet Biščević, Croatian Deputy Foreign Minister:
'More than ten years have passed since we successfully ended the war. We must be aware that no society can develop if it freezes itself in a certain point in time, regardless of how important this point is for the history of that society. The world around us is changing fast. If we lag behind, we will find ourselves in isolation, and we will decay'. 'The point of negotiating with the European Union can be described as -the complete and full transformation of Croatian society. The EU accession means an increased standard of living, a stronger economy, and more opportunities for investment and new jobs being created day by day. By becoming a member of the Union, Croatia will enter the system of collective peace and security, and will participate in the process of decision-making.' 2 These four objectives (to make society more transparent and open; to strengthen the national economy and improve the standard of living; to enhance the level of security; and to increase political influence in European and in global affairs) have specific importance within the context of the recent history of conflicts in Croatia and its immediate neighbourhood.
In the specific Croatian context, membership of the European Union is seen as the ultimate recognition that Croatia no longer represents an exception, but is a normal European state, equal in status and character to others. This is why membership of the European Union is now seen as a 'second recognition', and is compared to official By being unfair, acting from a position of might, not principles, the EU -Tudjman argued -often treated Croatia as a 'small nation', an unimportant factor in international politics, which could be commanded at the will of the great powers.
Tudjman's rhetoric against Europe now became increasingly similar to the one he European culture will emerge and that it will successfully replace the existing small identities. This will not happen -the historical, religious and recent ideological differences were here to stay. The bloody collapse of Yugoslavia (which was united by a much more coherent ideology and more ethno-historical similarities than the new Europe) should teach us a lesson -that these differences should not be neglected.
They will ultimately, Tudjmanists believed, make any new federal Europe as unlikely as it was the case with a federal Yugoslavia.
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In general, such rhetoric was not unpopular in Croatia, as was evident from electoral successes of Tudjman's HDZ at all parliamentary elections in the 1990s. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, Croatia was a new state, which for the first four years of its existence suffered severe internal and inter-state military conflicts on its own territory. A belief that Europe had indeed failed to prevent or stop the conflict was widespread -not only in Croatia but elsewhere too. Europe's hesitant interventions cast a shadow of deep doubt over its ability and/or willingness to act. Secondly, the war further radicalised those who participated in it -Croats and Serbs alike. Europe at the same time made grounds for a new myth of martyrium. 14 Croatia survived the war, despite being left 'barehanded, helpless at the mercy of the superiority of the Yugoslav Army, then considered to be one of the strongest military powers in Europe', he said on 6 November 1996 -it has survived because it has 'mustered amazing stamina and maturity with which it has alone, by virtue of its own strength and only with God's help -won its place in the international order' -it will therefore be able to survive on its own in future too. Croatia looked more similar to Serbia than to the new democracies in its neighbourghood. Tudjman personally was still popular, but this was largely due to respect for his role during the first half of the 1990s, in which he led the country towards independence and stood at its helm during the war. By 1997 it was already obvious that he suffered from terminal illness -which in fact only further discouraged the opposition forces from attacking his policies. Rather than taking risks by openly challenging his policy, they decided to prepare for the post-Tudjmanist era.
On 3 January 2000, only three weeks after Tudjman's death, his party lost parliamentary elections to a coalition of anti-Tudjmanist forces, which consisted of six parties and was led by the Social-Democrats (SDP) and Social-Liberals (HSLS).
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The coalition won convincingly: it controlled a majority of 95 seats to HDZ's 46. including the fear of being defenceless. Serbia was a great example of what was likely to happen to a state which refused to accept that there were limits to its power.
Isolation and even worse was the price that was paid for this illusion of selfsufficiency, which was based on an unrealistic perception of Serbia's greatness. 'For me personally, and for the government, there are no problems regarding regional co-operation. However, the other thing is that we still have to explain certain issues and we still have to take into account the fears which are based on our experience of being a part of some other associations up until recently, and which have not ended happily. I have in mind our recent history. But -as I said -my government fully
Croatia -which
understands that it has to accept European criteria if it wants to be a part of Europe.
And European criteria -that means: co-operation with neighbours, with the region. I cannot imagine a stable Croatia without stability of our neighbours.' Faced with massive public protests and blocked by internal divisions between coalition partners, the government failed to act quickly, and thus enabled both generals to avoid extradition. It was reported that Gotovina had gone into hiding on 14 . This is not surprising. In the aftermath of 4 October, the EU was no longer seen as unfair towards Croatia, and no longer the supervisor, tutor and punisher. This might yet change once the talks are under way, especially if the conditions were to be seen as too restrictive. But, it is unlikely that the public would turn anti-European now when no major political party remains to organise anti-European politics. In addition, the more open the Union becomes towards Croatia, the more enthusiastic will Croats be about joining the Union.
Croatian politicians now emphasise that the good relationship they have with countries that entered the Union in 2004 would certainly help, as they were willing to help with their own experience in negotiations. The Chief negotiator, Vladimir Drobnjak, stated that the Slovakian experience would be particularly helpful, as this country went through negotiations rather quickly, having joined the accession talks at a later stage, due to political reasons. 46 Croatia will try to take advantage of its smallness in terms of territory and population and will argue that it should be easy to 'absorb' in the European Union as it has a fairly advanced economy and it is a sound and stable democracy. 47 Politicians hope that the accession talks could be completed within the next two or three years. It would be nice, they say, if Croatian citizens could participate in the elections to the European parliament in 2009.
This will, however, depend not only on Croatia -which is now seen as fully cooperative with the ICTY -but also on circumstances beyond its (or perhaps anybody else's) control. In particular, two of them will be very significant. 47 Interview with Vladimir Drobnjak, ibid. This statement indicates that Croatia does not want to be treated as a part of a 'package' with Turkey, nor as a part of a 'regional approach', i.e. in the same block with other countries of the 'Western Balkans'. 48 In October 2005, Croatia proposed that the border dispute with Slovenia is dealt with via international arbitration, but Slovenia refused, and proposed that these issues should become part of the accession talks. Slovenia hopes that as a member-state of the Union it might be in an advantageous position if the talks are held within the framework of accession. In addition, the Slovenian Foreign Minister, Dimitrij Rupel, confirmed that a Slovenian referendum on Croatian membership was a possibility, if no solution for the Bay of Piran was achieved.
